Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 25
Issue 2
Symposium: Belonging, Families and Family Law

Article 3

3-5-2011

Where (in the World) do Children Belong?
Annette Laquer Estin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Annette Laquer Estin, Where (in the World) do Children Belong?, 25 BYU J. Pub. L. 217 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol25/iss2/3

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Where (in the World) do Children Belong?
Ann Laquer Estin*
Many children live in families that form and extend and dissolve
across international borders. The question of where these children
“belong” is complicated, with different answers in different contexts.
Belonging is sometimes determined in formal terms, based on citizenship or legal immigration status. Belonging is sometimes a matter of
fact, as with the “habitual residence” concept used in the Hague
Children’s Conventions. Belonging may be understood more subjectively, as a matter of identity and affiliation, based on daily life or ties
of family, culture, language, and heritage. Belonging can be simply a
matter of the child’s presence in a place. Children in the global village
rarely belong to just one place, and, in general, the broadest conception of where children belong helps to assure that governments will act
to protect their welfare. When different claims of belonging come into
conflict, parents and authorities should seek to understand, respect and
protect children’s multiple and diverse affiliations.
For children who grow up in closely knit communities, rooted in a
particular place, the question of belonging is an easy one. In these
places, common ties of language, culture, religion, and family foster a
deep and layered sense of connection. Other children grow up belonging to multiple places and different communities, often geographically
dispersed and sometimes spanning the globe. For children in global
families, the question of belonging raises many troubling questions at
the intersection of immigration law, family law, and international law.
Laws in the United States take three distinct approaches to the
question of where children belong. One definition of belonging turns
on citizenship or immigration status, another looks to the place where
the child is at home or “habitually resident,” and a third asks only if
the child is present within the geographic borders of the state. Although each of these three approaches applies in a different sphere,
they regularly come into conflict.
With this essay, I argue that we can best serve the interests of
*

Aliber Family Chair in Law, University of Iowa. Prepared for the Symposium on Belonging,
Families, and Family Law, BYU Law School, Jan. 28, 2011.
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children in global circumstances by adopting a broad conception of belonging, based on the principle that children have a right to the care
and protection of their parents and the different communities in which
they belong. In circumstances of conflict, courts, agencies, governments, and parents should seek to understand, respect, and protect
children’s many affiliations, including their ties to people and places
that may be far away. Part I describes the three approaches to belonging reflected in our laws and notes some of the areas of conflict between these approaches. Part II sketches an argument for respecting
children’s affiliations in their full breadth, depth, and complexity,
drawn both from principles of constitutional law and from international human rights.
I. CITIZENSHIP, RESIDENCE, AND PRESENCE
Traditional Anglo-American doctrine placed jurisdiction over the
child’s custody and welfare in the place where the child was domiciled, while the civil law tradition looked to the country of citizenship.1 In both systems, children’s identity depended on their fathers,
just as a married woman’s domicile and nationality followed her husband’s, defining with relative clarity where a family belonged.2 More
modern approaches recognized that women should have equal rights to
establish a domicile or nationality and equal rights with respect to the
nationality of their children. One result has been many more families
with multiple and mixed citizenship or residence and multiple places
of belonging. Rules based on nationality and domicile continue to
weave through our jurisprudence, along with a strand that traces to the
parens patriae notion that the state bears responsibility for the welfare
of children present within its borders.

A. Belonging Based on Citizenship
American immigration and nationality laws seem generous in their
treatment of children. We extend full citizenship to children born
within our geographic borders,3 to children born abroad with a U.S.1

See Adair Dyer, The Internationalization of Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625,
635–36 (1997).
2
See Ann Laquer Estin, Families and Children in International Law: An Introduction, 12
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 295–300 (2002).
3
See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1994), which is based on Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
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citizen parent,4 and to many children who are adopted by U.S. citizens.5 These rules extend membership on the basis of family ties or
place of birth, but they also suggest the importance of social or community affiliation. Thus, a child cannot inherit U.S. citizenship unless
one or both parents have lived for a period of time in the United
States.6
Children who are not U.S. citizens may have lawful permanent
resident (“LPR”) status.7 This extends the right to stay indefinitely in
the United States but is less secure than citizenship. Despite what may
be lifelong ties, an individual with LPR status is subject to removal
from the United States in cases of a criminal conviction.8 Non-citizen
children without LPR status may be lawfully present on temporary,
nonimmigrant visas, or they may have no legal status. Undocumented
immigrant children are particularly vulnerable to disruption of their
family or community ties in the United States.9
We extend citizenship readily to children for important reasons,
but that citizenship is less complete than adult citizenship, granting
child citizens fewer rights than adult citizens.10 Children’s immigration
status is usually derivative, following the status of their parents.11 Although parents are generally able to extend their status to their children, citizen-children do not have the right to petition for their parents
until after they reach adulthood.12 When parents who are undocumented or out of status are removed from the United States, the fact
that they have citizen children is not a basis for cancellation of removal. As a result, children who are citizens are very often deported along
with their parents.13
4

Id. § 1401(c)–(e), (g).

5

Child Citizenship Act of 2000, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2000); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 320, 322

(2003).
6
See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c), (g); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), (c). This is one of the underlying issues in United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2009), which was argued
in the United States Supreme Court on November 10, 2010.
7
8 U.S.C. § 1101(20) (2010). See generally David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family Law in the Context of Child Custody , 59
HASTINGS L.J. 453, 476 (2008).
8
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2008); see also Thronson, supra note 7, at 476.
9
Undocumented children have some legal protection based on their presence in the United
States. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (equal protection/school attendance); see also
infra Part I.C.
10
This is true as a matter of civic personhood, most notably the limitation of voting rights
to citizens age eighteen or older.
11
See David B. Thronson, Kids Will be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s
Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 991–95 (2002).
12
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A) (2009).
13
See generally Jacqueline Bhabha, The “Mere Fortuity of Birth”? Children, Mothers,
Borders and the Meaning of Citizenship , in MIGRATION AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP,
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Courts in many nations take jurisdiction on the basis of nationality
in family law or personal status matters concerning children. This can
be problematic when children, or their parents, are dual citizens, and
when different family members have different citizenship or immigration status. These differences pose impossible challenges in some international custody cases, particularly when one parent is not permitted to enter or reside in the country where the child lives.14

B. Belonging Based on Residence
Although traditional approaches to child custody jurisdiction
looked to the child’s place of domicile or nationality, the modern view
recognizes a variety of appropriate grounds for jurisdiction.15 This increased the likelihood that several states or countries might have concurrent authority in custody matters, generating enormous conflict of
laws problems. Both in the United States and internationally, current
practice seeks to reduce these conflicts by assigning jurisdictional
priority to a child’s “home state” or “habitual residence.” In most
states, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA)16 governs jurisdiction in child custody and child protection
matters. The UCCJEA treats a state where a child has lived for six
months prior to the commencement of custody proceedings as the
child’s “home state” for jurisdictional purposes.17 A court may take
jurisdiction on this basis without regard to the nationality or immigration status of the child or his or her parents.18 When the child’s “home
state” is in another state or a foreign country, however, the statute
limits state courts to exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction,
BORDERS, AND GENDER 187 (Selya Benahbib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009); David B. Thronson,
Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165 (2006);
Sonja Starr & Lea Brillmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 259–67 (2003).
14
Bhabha, supra note 13, at 202–06.
15
See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 12.5 (Student 2d ed. 1988); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS §
15.39 (4th ed. 2004); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971 &
1988 rev.).
16
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 102(4), 9 U.L.A. 662
(1999) [hereinafter UCCJEA].
17
Id. § 201(a). This section governs jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination. Different rules apply if a court in another state or a foreign country has already made a
child-custody determination under jurisdictional circumstances that are consistent with the
UCCJEA.
18
Adoption of Peggy, 767 N.E.2d 29, 35–38 (Mass. 2002); Arteaga v. Texas Dep’t of
Protective and Regulatory Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); In re Stephanie
M., 867 P.2d 706, 713–17 (Cal. 1994). Cf. In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 89 (Neb. 2009)
(stating that the state court has jurisdiction despite fact that parent faced deportation).
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even if the child holds U.S. citizenship.19
At an international level, the Hague Children’s Conventions allocate responsibility for decisions regarding children to the child’s place
of habitual residence.20 The United States currently participates in the
Child Abduction Convention21 and the Intercountry Adoption Convention22 and has been moving toward ratification of the Child Support
Convention23 and the Child Protection Convention.24 Beyond the Hague Conventions, the United Nations Guidelines for the Alternative
Care of Children, adopted in February 2010, provide that
[a]ll decisions concerning alternative care should take full account of
the desirability, in principle, of maintaining the child as close as
possible to his/her habitual place of residence, in order to facilitate
contact and potential reintegration with his/her family and to minim25
ize disruption of his/her educational, cultural and social life.

As used in these conventions, habitual residence is intended to
19
UCCJEA § 204(a) (“A court of this State has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the
child is present in this State and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency
to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”).
20
See Dyer, supra note 1, at 636; Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: The Hague Children’s Conventions and the Case for International Family Law in the United States, 62
FLA. L. REV. 47, 53 (2010).
21
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980,1343 U.N.T.S. 89, 19 I.L.M. 1501–05 (1980) [hereinafter Child Abduction Convention],
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt28en.pdf.
22
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134–46 (1993) [hereinafter Adoption Convention],
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt33en.pdf.
23
Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of
Family Maintenance, Nov. 23, 2007, 47 I.L.M. 257 (2008), available at http://www.hcch.net/
upload/conventions/txt38en.pdf. See id. at arts. 18 and 20; S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-21 and S.
EXEC. REP. 111-2 (Jan. 22, 2010). The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification in
October 2010, but as of January 2011 Congress has not enacted implementing legislation. See
Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Chairman Kerry: U.S. Senate Approves Hague Convention on the Int’l Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family
Maint. (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/press/
chair/release/?id=066edb31-65a3-44b9-8c68-ed9ba917f413.
24
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, Oct.
19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1391 (1996) [hereinafter Child Protection Convention], available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt34en.pdf. See id. at art. 5. The United States signed
the Child Protection Convention in October 2010. Press Release, Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S.
Sec’y of State, U.S. Signature of the Child Protection Convention (Oct. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149860.htm.
25
Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, G.A. Res. 64/142, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/64/142 (24 Feb. 2010), available at http://www.sos-childrensvillages.org/Documents/
SOSpublication-Guidelines-AlternativeCare.pdf.
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raise a relatively simple question of fact, avoiding the many technicalities that have surrounded concepts like “domicile” or “nationality.”26
Nationality and domicile also imply a singular and stable link between
an individual and a specific jurisdiction, and families that are internationally mobile tend to have a much more complex reality. The habitual residence principle is largely neutral, reflecting the wider process
of globalization and migration that gives rise to these family situations.
By focusing on habitual residence, the treaties direct our attention to
the choices that parents have made and the child’s lived experience.27
In practice, determination of habitual residence can be difficult for
children who have lived in more than one country, particularly when
parents have different intentions and loyalties. Courts in two places
may reach different conclusions as to which country is a child’s habitual residence, or as to whether and how quickly the child’s habitual
residence has changed.28
Questions of belonging are also at the core of many relocation
disputes, in which one parent seeks to move with a child across international borders, often to a place where the parent has stronger ties or
a better living situation. These cases challenge authorities to weigh the
arguments for maintaining a child’s residence against the possible advantages of a move, in circumstances that may involve serious conflict
between the child’s parents and conflicting visions of the child’s identity. Whether or not relocation is permitted, the child may be left with
strong ties to different countries and parents living far apart.
The Children’s Conventions are carefully neutral on the question
of citizenship, but experience with the treaties has revealed a number
of tensions between the norms of habitual residence and citizenship.
This is true under the Child Abduction Convention, which mandates
the return of a child who has been wrongfully removed to or retained
in a country that is not the child’s habitual residence.29 Courts in the
United States applying the Convention have entered return orders for
children who are U.S. citizens, rejecting the argument that this violates some right of citizenship.30 But popular and political debate
26
See Estin, supra note 20, at 53; E.M. Clive, The Concept of Habitual Residence, 1997
JURID. REV. 137.
27
See Rhona Schuz, Policy Considerations in Determining the Habitual Residence of a
Child and the Relevance of Context, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 101 (2001).
28
See the discussion in Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 990–92 (6th Cir. 2007). See
generally Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence in International Abduction Cases under the Hague Convention , 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325, 3354–60
(2009).
29
Child Abduction Convention, supra note 21, art. 3.
30
E.g., March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001). In the custody context, a court
rejected the argument that an order allowing a custodial parent to remove a U.S.-citizen child to

217]

WHERE DO CHILDREN BELONG?

223

over child abduction cases, here and abroad, often highlights the
child’s citizenship.31 Courts consider questions of nationality or immigration status explicitly in connection with the defense that is available
when the removal or retention occurred more than a year before the
proceeding was commenced and “the child is now settled in its new
environment.”32 In some cases, in some countries, the child’s citizenship—or factors such as culture, language, or tradition that stand for a
similar claim of belonging—seems to play a role, particularly when
the habitual residence norm would require sending a child away from
his or her country of citizenship. As a practical matter, in parental abduction disputes handled by consular officials, intervention is more
likely to occur or succeed when the interests of a U.S.-citizen parent
or child are at stake.33 Finally, the primacy of habitual residence over
nationality in the Abduction Convention may be a factor in the reluctance of some nations to participate.
Immigration and citizenship issues are also centrally important in
the practice of intercountry adoption under the Hague Adoption Convention. This Convention requires that a child brought into a receiving
state for adoption must be eligible to enter and remain permanently,
but it does not require that the child must be eligible for citizenship.34
It also does not address whether and to what extent children’s citizenship or other ties to their country of origin should be protected after
intercountry adoption.
Practices of the member countries vary on these points.35 Children
adopted abroad by U.S.-citizen parents acquire citizenship automaticalanother country violated the child’s constitutional rights. See Schleiffer v. Meyers, 644 F.2d
656, 663 (7th Cir. 1981). But see Zaubi v. Hoejme, 530 F. Supp. 831, 838 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(abstaining and refusing to reach the constitutional question); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 296
N.W.2d 490, 495–97 (N.D. 1980) (failing to decide if a child has a constitutional right to stay in
the U.S.).
31
For a political example, compare H.R. Res. 1326, 111th Cong. (2010), which addresses
the problem of “abduction to and retention of United States citizen children in Japan.” with H.
Res. 125, 111th Cong. (2009), which addresses international child abduction issues in terms of
habitual residence rather than citizenship. See also Betty de Hart, “A Paradise for Kidnapping
Parents”: Public Discourses on Parental Child Abduction in the Netherlands , presented at London Metropolitan University, July 2, 2010 (manuscript on file with the author).
32
Child Abduction Convention, supra note 21, art. 3. See, e.g., In re B. Del C.S.B., 559
F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2009). See generally Catherine Norris, Immigration and Abduction: The Re-

levance of U.S. Immigration Status to Defenses Under the Hague Convention on International
Child Abduction, 98 CAL. L. REV. 159, 174–83 (2010).
33
See generally LUKE T. LEE & JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 125-30,

186-90 (3d ed. 2008). U.S. consular practice is addressed in part 7 of the State Department’s
Foreign Affairs Manual, available at http://www.state.gov/m/a/dir/regs/fam/.
34
Adoption Convention, supra note 22, at art. 5(c).
35
William Duncan, Nationality and the Protection of Children Across Frontiers, and the
Example of Intercountry Adoption, 8 Y.B. OF PRIV. INT’L L. 75 (2006).
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ly upon entry to the United States,36 and only U.S. citizens can obtain
visas to bring a newly-adopted child into the country.37 To help protect the integrity of the Hague Adoption rules, U.S. regulations define
a child’s “habitual residence” with reference to the child’s country of
citizenship.38 Thus, officials in the child’s country of citizenship must
approve an adoption into the United States, even if the child has been
habitually resident in a different nation.
The complex linkage between adoption, belonging, and citizenship
is also suggested by the practice in those countries that ask parents to
send post-adoption reports back to the child’s country of origin concerning the child’s development and welfare. Many adoptive parents
work to support their children’s sense of belonging to their original
home country, and some adoptees make significant efforts to reconnect
with their birth places or families after reaching adulthood. Depending
on the countries involved, adopted children may retain the citizenship
of their country of birth, even after obtaining new citizenship through
an intercountry adoption.39
Although habitual residence provides a basis for jurisdiction in
family law and international family law, we have not seen it as a sufficient basis for extending political membership to children without citizenship or immigration status, even if they have lived virtually all of
their lives within our borders and have only tenuous ties to their country of nationality. The debate in recent years over the DREAM Act
underlines this point. Passage of this legislation would extend conditional resident status to many children who entered the country before
age 16, and create a pathway to citizenship for those who serve in the
military or graduate from college.40

36
Child Citizenship Act of 2000, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2000). Children who immigrate for
purposes of adoption as lawful permanent residents acquire citizenship automatically once the
adoption is granted or recognized by state authorities. 8 U.S.C. §1431. See generally SARAH B.
IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE FAMILY § 15:31 (2010 Update).
37
8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(F), (G). See generally IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra note 36
§_13:15 and §13:43. A lawful permanent resident may petition for admission of an adopted child
under §1101(b)(1)(E), and may obtain a family preference visa for an adopted minor child under
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A) (2006), but these procedures include a number of additional requirements and obstacles. See generally IGNATIUS & STICKNEY, supra note 36 §§3:3 and 13:2-13:14.
38
A child present in the United States who is not a U.S. citizen is deemed to be habitually
resident in his or her country of citizenship. See 8 C.F.R §204.3(k) (2008).
39
See Duncan, supra note 35.
40
For one iteration of this legislation, which passed the House but failed in the Senate in
December 2010, see the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S.
3992,111th Cong. (2010).
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C. Belonging Based on Presence
In order to protect the interests of children, state courts assert jurisdiction over all children present within the geographic borders of
the state. Both the UCCJEA41 and the Hague Child Protection Convention42 provide for temporary emergency jurisdiction on this basis,
and in these cases, courts may assume jurisdiction over families including parents or children who are not (or not all) citizens or habitual
residents.43 Under the “status exception” to the personal jurisdiction
requirement,44 our courts conclude that they need not have personal
jurisdiction over the child’s parents in child welfare cases, even when
the proceeding may result in termination of parental rights.45 Constitutional due process norms protect the rights of nonresident parents to
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, but this may prove difficult in
cases with international dimensions.46
Global children’s cases raise important issues of language, culture,
and the need for casework and litigation techniques that can reach
across international borders. Even locating the child’s parents or extended family members may prove difficult. These factors have important implications for the parents’ right to due process and the larger
goal of serving the best interests of the child.
Despite the practical difficulties, courts and agencies working with
global families should make careful efforts to provide real notice and a
meaningful opportunity for a hearing to parents beyond their jurisdiction. Agencies such as International Social Service can assist in locating and working with family members abroad, and devices such as the
Hague Service and Evidence Conventions provide channels for judicial
assistance.47 For cases involving children or parents who are foreign
41
42
43

See UCCJEA § 204(a).
Child Protection Convention, supra note 24, at art. 5.
See e.g., In re Nada R., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); see also supra

note 18.
44

See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–45 (1877); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977). But see May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). These cases are
discussed in CLARK, supra note 15, and SCOLES, supra note 15.
45
See e.g., In re W.A., 63 P.3d 607, 613–17 (Utah 2002) (citing cases); see also J.D. v.
Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 923 So. 2d 303 (Alab. Civ. App. 2005); In re Thomas
J.R., 663 N.W.2d 734, 738–49 (Wis. 2003). But see In re Claudia S., 31 Cal. Rptr.3d 697,
703–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); In re John Doe, 926 P.2d 1290, 1296–98 (Haw. 1996) (reversing
termination of parental rights of mother in the Philippines whose only contact with the state was
agreeing to the father’s taking child there for a brief visit).
46
See Ann Laquer Estin, Global Child Welfare: The Challenges for Family Law, 63
OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
47
These are the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov.15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658
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or dual nationals, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations mandates consular notice and access once a child is taken into care.48 Both
the Child Abduction Convention and the Child Protection Convention
provide tools for communication and cooperation between judicial and
other authorities in Contracting States.49 In these cases, it is particularly important for authorities to listen to the voices of children who are
old enough to express their own sense of family and community ties.
In child welfare cases, the most difficult challenge may be balancing our strong humanitarian impulses and our tendency to favor ties
based on presence and recent care for a child against the substantial
risk that the process will skew against children’s interest in family
preservation and parents’ rights to make decisions concerning their
children.50 This conflict appears most starkly in the context of special
immigrant juvenile status, which opens a path to lawful residence and
citizenship for undocumented children whose parental rights have been
terminated.51 It is tempting to view termination of parental rights as
beneficial precisely because it may allow a child to obtain lawful permanent residence and remain in the United States.52 The same humanitarian impulses extend to children beyond our borders who are caught

U.N.T.S. 163, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 341 (1965), and the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S.
7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, appended to 28 U.S.C. § 1781, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 37 (1969).
48
Done at Vienna 24 April 1963, entered in force 19 March 1967. UNTS v. 596 p. 261,
ratified by the United States on 24 November 1969 [21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (1970).]
Consular notice should be understood not simply as a procedural requirement, but as a practical
means of initiating cooperation between governments. See Arteaga v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective
and Regulatory Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 761 (Tex. App. 1996); E.R. v. Marion Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 729 N.E.2d 1052, 1056–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); In re Angelica L., 767
N.W.2d 74, 96–97 (Neb. 2009) (Gerrard, J., concurring).
49
Child Abduction Convention, supra note 21, at arts. 7, 15; Child Protection Convention, supra note 22, at arts. 29–39.
50
See, e.g., In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793 (Tenn. 2007) (involving parents
who spent years trying to regain custody of their daughter in a case that drew significant public
attention); In re Sanjivini K., 391 N.E.2d 1316 (N.Y. 1979). Andrew Jacobs, Chinese and
American Cultures Clash in Custody Battle for Girl, 5, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at A14; see
also Amity R. Boye, Note, Making Sure Children Find Their Way Home: Obligating States Under International Law to Return Dependent Children to Family Members Abroad, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1515 (2004).
51
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 CFR § 204.11 (2009). See generally IGNATIUS &
STICKNEY, supra note 36 §§14:84 – 14:87; Thronson, supra note 11, at 1003–13. Note that the
SIJS statute was amended in 2008 by the Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).
52
A child may be eligible for Special Immigrant Juvenile status under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(J) if a state court determines that “reunification with one or both immigrant’s parents
is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment or a similar basis found under State law” and
makes a determination that it would not be in the child’s best interest to be returned to the
child’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or the country of last habitual residence.
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in war or natural disaster.53 In these cases, we need to take care so
that our eagerness to embrace children who are victims of circumstances does not blind us to the importance of respecting and preserving their family ties.54
II. BELONGING FROM THE CHILD’S PERSPECTIVE
Whether we frame the question of belonging in terms of citizenship, residence, or presence, children’s membership is less stable and
more contested than adult status, largely subject to adult decisions in
which the child has little voice.55 The rules that define which children
belong to the United States reveal more about adult rights than about
children’s interests. We understand that an important privilege of adult
citizenship or immigrant status is the ability to confer that status on
family members, whether those family ties result from birth or adoption. Adult citizens have mobilized the government, including Congress and the State Department, to assist them in reaching out beyond
our borders to establish new family ties through marriage and adoption
or to protect their custodial rights.56 This doesn’t work in the other direction, however, and the contrast between special immigrant juvenile
status and the repeated failure of the DREAM Act makes this clear.
For unparented, noncitizen children present in the United States, we
extend the old idea of parens patriae and authorize the state, acting
through a juvenile court, to extend permanent residency.57 For noncitizen children in the United States with ongoing ties to their noncitizen
parents, we do not offer access to formal membership, whatever the
strength of their local ties.58 Their foreign parental ties effectively disqualify them from citizenship.
What would it mean to consider belonging from the child’s perspective? Our constitutional tradition includes strong protection for pa53

We have seen this recently in the evacuation of children from Haiti after the 2010
earthquake and a generation ago in “Operation Babylift” at the end of the war in Vietnam. For
litigation brought by family members seeking custody of children after the babylift, see Huynh
Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978). See also Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528
F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975).
54
See UNICEF’s Position on Inter-country Adoption, (July 22, 2010), available at
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_41918.html.
55
See, e.g., Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985); Gonzalez v. Reno, 212
F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000).
56
See Thronson, supra note 7, at 510–11 (pointing out that the Child Citizenship Act “was
legislation prompted largely by concerns over how immigration law operated as family law,
reaching into white, middle class families with U.S. citizen parents.”).
57
See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
58
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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rental rights, with the understanding that the state may intervene to
protect children from harm.59 We do not have a similarly robust constitutional tradition addressing children’s constitutional interest in protection of their family relationships.60 This is more clearly established
in international human rights law, including the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)61 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),62 in provisions that reflect a
broad global consensus consistent with many aspects of our own legal
tradition.
Both the ICCPR and the CRC recognize the family as the “fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth
and well-being of all its members and particularly children . . . .”63
Picking up on the idea that families are particularly important for
children, the CRC Preamble states “that the child, for the full and
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in
a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.”64 Both conventions recognize the important roles of family,
society, and the state in protecting children,65 and the CRC requires
that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be
a primary consideration.”66 In addition, the CRC extends to a child
“who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express
those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity
of the child.”67
Several provisions in the CRC emphasize the importance of protecting a child’s relationships with both parents, even in international
59

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–69 (2000).
Id. at 80–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 16, 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976
(ratified by the United States in 1992).
62
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25 (Annex), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 1577
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted at 28 I.L.M. 1456 (1989). The United States has signed but not yet ratified the CRC.
63
Id. at pmbl. & art. 5. See also ICCPR, supra note 61, at art. 23(1) (“The family is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
state.”).
64
CRC, supra note 62, at pmbl.
65
See ICCPR, supra note 61, at art. 24(1); CRC, supra note 62, at arts. 3(2), 5, 9, 18(1),
19, 20.
66
CRC, supra note 62, at art. 3(1).
67
Id. at art. 12(1).
60
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cases. Article 9(1) states that “States Parties shall ensure that a child
shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except
when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is
necessary for the best interests of the child.”68 All interested parties
must be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and
make their views known. Seen from the child’s perspective, Article
9(3) affirms the child’s right to maintain “personal relations and direct
contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to
the child’s best interests.” Under Article 10(2), this same right to
maintain personal relations and direct contact applies to a child whose
parents reside in different countries.69
In the context of child welfare proceedings, Article 19 mandates
that States Parties take appropriate measures “to protect the child from
all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect of
negligent treatment, maltreatment of exploitation, including sexual
abuse . . . .” Article 20 addresses alternative care for children who
are temporarily or permanently deprived of their family environment,
or who cannot safely be allowed to remain in that environment. Noting that such alternative care could include “foster placement, kafalah
of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children,” Article 20(3) stipulates that in considering alternatives “due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious,
cultural and linguistic background.” The importance of continuity is
also reflected in the U.N. Guidelines for the Alternative Care of
Children, which embrace the habitual residence principle for circumstances in which children are removed from the care of their parents.70
Respect for the child’s “ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic
background” is a corollary of the nondiscrimination principle in both
the CRC and the ICCPR which prohibit discrimination on grounds including “race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth . . . .”71 Such respect also follows from the
68
Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (“Before a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that
the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”).
69
This may not apply in “exceptional circumstances;” but note that Art. 10(2) goes on to
specify that States parties “shall respect the right of the child and his or her parents to leave any
country, including their own, and to enter their own country.” See also Article 11, requiring
States Parties to “take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return of children aboard,”
such as the measures included in the Hague Child Abduction Convention.
70
See Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, supra note 25.
71
See ICCPR, supra note 61, at art. 24(1). See also CRC, supra note 60, at art. 2(1)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or oth-
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identity rights protected by the conventions, including the right to a
name, a nationality, and “to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”72 The conventions reflect particular historic concerns with the
harms that result from a lack of birth registration or statelessness, and
thus, they do not address the possibility of multiple nationality or conflicting identity claims, except to affirm that a child has a right to personal relations and direct contact with both parents.73
The continuity principle is also embedded in the provisions on intercountry adoption in CRC Article 21, which suggests that intercountry adoption “may be considered as an alternative means of child’s
care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or
cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child’s country of
origin.” In the adoption context, the question of where children belong
is strenuously contested, and the language of Article 21 has been a
source of controversy—particularly if it is read to suggest that institutional care in the child’s habitual residence is preferable to adoption
into another ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic setting. Many
adoption advocates and experts in the United States prefer the language in the CRC Preamble, recognizing that a child should grow up
in a family environment.74
For displaced children, including those who are accompanied by
their parents and those who are unaccompanied, CRC Article 22 requires states to take appropriate measures to ensure that children seeking refugee status are eligible for such status and receive appropriate
protection and humanitarian assistance. This includes the same protections that would be extended to adults under international law, as well
as assistance in tracing parents or other family members to facilitate
the child’s reunification with his or her family, if possible.75
What do these principles of international human rights law suggest
on the question of where children belong? Children belong to both of
their parents, to their extended families, and to the communities defined by their birth, upbringing and their ethnic, religious, cultural or
linguistic identity. When children are separated from parents and family members, or when those adults cannot safely or adequately care for
children, it is the responsibility of the larger surrounding community
to act on their behalf. When children’s lives reach across borders,
er opinion, national ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status”).
72
See CRC, supra note 62, at arts. 7, 8; ICCPR, supra note 61 at arts. 24(2), (3).
73
CRC, supra note 62, at art. 10(2).
74
See supra text accompanying note 63.
75
If no parents or other family members can be found, the child should be accorded “the
same protection as any other child permanently or temporarily deprived of his or her family environment for any reason.” Id.
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when they belong in more than one place, we can make efforts to protect all of these important ties.
A broad approach to belonging understands that children have
many types of affiliation. It encourages cooperation and communication whenever possible, at every level, to protect children’s ties based
on birth, family, residence, and citizenship. It suggests that we should
act to protect all children within our borders, and respect all aspects of
children’s identity, including those that reach into distant places. It
suggests, in every case, that we should strive to hear what children
have to tell us about where they feel that they belong.

